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Waiting for Merkron: The Franco-German Relationship 
and Eurozone Reform after the Elections 
Henning Deters and Magnus G. Schoeller 
The Eurozone crisis is not overcome yet. It may be 
suspended, mainly due to European Central Bank 
President Draghi’s announcement ‘to do whatever it 
takes to preserve the euro’, but the underlying design 
failures are far from fixed. Thus, a bank insolvency in a 
Eurozone member state or disagreement about the 
next credit tranche for Greece may be enough to 
reignite the crisis. To rule out fragmentation, the 
Eurozone must be further reformed. Leading 
economists from France and Germany have recently 
emphasized that this reform strongly depends on a 
Franco-German compromise (Véron et al. 2017). 
Indeed, the Franco-German ’tandem’ has always been 
a motor for European integration, especially regarding 
the common currency. This role is not self-evident, 
however. While their intense cooperation during the 
Euro crisis earned French President Sarkozy and 
German Chancellor Merkel the label ‘Merkozy’ (Schild 
2013), cooperation cooled down under President 
Hollande, and the Eurozone reform stalled. Since the 
election of Emmanuel Macron as French President, we 
can observe a new wave of optimism when it comes to 
the Franco-German tandem. In this policy brief, we 
therefore assess the likelihood of ‘Merkron’: under 
which conditions can there be a revival of the tandem 
in the Eurozone?  
Previous research tells us that the Franco-German 
motor is most successful if the preferences of the two 
governments diverge (Webber 1999). In such a case 
they have to find a compromise that also embraces 
other member states’ preferences. This explains why, 
when a Franco-German compromise exists, the Council 
often adopts it largely unchanged. By contrast, if the 
positions of France and Germany are too close, the 
tandem has no traction. Fearing to be marginalized, the 
Executive Summary 
> France and Germany have fundamentally different 
interests concerning the Eurozone. Contrary to 
prevailing sentiment, the recent elections in both 
countries will therefore not necessarily reignite 
the Franco-German motor to bring about the 
pending Eurozone reform. 
 
> Although Merkel did not refuse Macron’s recent 
Euro reform plans, the ostensible agreement is 
owed to the fact that both sides mean different 
things when referring to an EU Finance Minister or 
a fiscal capacity to stabilize Eurozone economies. 
 
> Disagreement extends to strengthening the 
Eurozone’s social dimension and the revived idea 
of a European unemployment protection scheme. 
By contrast, France and Germany agree on 
protecting their labour markets.  
 
> Macron frames problems in innovative ways and 
exhibits a cooperative style. Despite differences, a 
renewed tandem may therefore be able to reform 
the Eurozone if certain conditions are met: 
External drivers, such as, the ‘refugee crisis’ and 
security concerns may facilitate cross-sectoral 
package deals; at the EU level, a rekindling of the 
Euro crisis could increase pressure on the tandem 
to make concessions; domestically, reform may be 
required as a continued ‘muddling through’ could 
further strengthen right-wing populists. 
 
> Not in the least, any Franco-German entente will 
need to respect the preferences of other member 
states, promote the Eurozone’s social dimension, 
and strengthen its democratic legitimation. 
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remaining governments tend to reject the imposition of 
such an exclusive accord. Besides a tandem with or 
without traction, a third possibility is to have no tandem 
at all. This is the case when the preferences of France 
and Germany are simply too diverse to be reconciled, in 
spite of the unique institutionalization of Franco-
German cooperation. 
In short, for a strong tandem to emerge, the French and 
German preferences must hit the ‘sweet spot’ between 
conflict and cliquism. In order to assess the chances for 
a revival of the Franco-German partnership in the 
reform of the Eurozone, we first analyse the two 
countries’ respective preferences on key issues. 
Second, we identify the conditions under which 
‘Merkron’ is likely to occur. In contrast to the prevailing 
sentiment, we argue that the chances of a Franco-
German tandem to bring about the needed reform are 
tightly constrained by differences that are hard to 
reconcile. However, changes in the international 
security environment, a rekindling of the Euro crisis, and 
the populist challenge at home may make the twin-
engine restart. 
Issues and preferences in Eurozone reform 
One of the most pressing reform issues in the Eurozone 
is the completion of the Banking Union. However, 
instead of taking the lead on this issue, the Franco-
German tandem has come to a deadlock. The Banking 
Union is supposed to break the vicious circle (or ‘doom 
loop’) between sovereigns and banks in the Eurozone: 
if big banks get into trouble, their national governments 
bail them out, as they are considered too big to fail. This 
raises public debt and thus worsens the 
creditworthiness of the state. As banks hold sovereign 
bonds of their states, a lower creditworthiness reduces 
the value of these bonds in the banks’ balance sheets. 
This, in turn, may require (further) bailouts, and so on. 
Therefore, the EU has already adopted a common 
banking supervision and a bank resolution mechanism. 
However, it still lacks a common deposit insurance and 
a fiscal backstop to stabilize the financial system in case 
of a bank resolution. Regarding the latter, a single 
resolution fund will be built until 2024, but even then its 
capacity will remain limited. The German government 
insists on further steps to minimize risks at the national 
level before mutualizing them at the European level. 
The French government, by contrast, points to the fact 
that these risks only exist because the Banking Union is 
still incomplete. Therefore, it prefers to go on with the 
common deposit insurance and the fiscal backstop. 
A possible compromise to break this deadlock would be 
European Safe Bonds (ESBies): these are senior 
securities which are backed by a diversified portfolio of 
sovereign bonds. As they would allow banks to diversify 
their balance sheets, while highly indebted states would 
have to pay lower risk premiums on their bonds, they 
could be an instrument to break the doom loop 
between banks and states. However, although ESBies 
would not imply any joint liability, the German 
government is not enthusiastic about the idea. The 
main reason for the German scepticism is that ESBies 
would reduce market pressure on Eurozone states, 
which in turn may create moral hazard and reduce fiscal 
discipline. 
While the deadlock regarding the completion of the 
Banking Union has remained unresolved so far, the 
Eurozone Finance Minister has moved to centre stage 
since Macron’s election. Both governments support the 
idea, but there is reason to assume that they mean 
different things when they talk about a common 
Finance Minister. While the German government 
primarily refers to a European budget supervisor who 
enforces fiscal rules and sanctions, the French 
government thinks of a minister who can (also) decide 
about transfers to combat regional shocks or even 
recessions. Further competences, which could become 
part of a larger package deal, are the right to chair the 
negotiations of the Eurogroup and to represent the 
Eurozone internationally. In any case, a Eurozone 
Finance Minister would need his own budget, that is, 
fiscal capacity (Enderlein & Haas 2015). 
As opposed to Eurobonds, i.e. the issuance of common 
debt, a fiscal capacity has not been excluded by 
Germany. Chancellor Merkel is open to the idea ‘if used 
for sensible ends’. Thus, while a comprehensive 
Eurozone budget as preferred by President Macron 
seems unrealistic for the time being, a small budget to 
help Eurozone members implement economic reforms, 
fight youth unemployment, or boost labour mobility is 
quite possible. More ambitious would be a ‘rainy day 
fund’, as recently brought up by the European 
Commission and the Director of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), Klaus Regling. Such a fund would 
serve to fight economic shocks in single member states 
(European Commission 2017). However, a European 
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Monetary Fund could also fulfil this function: based on 
the existing ESM, this European version of the 
International Monetary Fund would allow member 
states to use common funds for fighting recessions. 
Both outgoing German Finance Minister Schäuble and 
Chancellor Merkel have expressed their support for the 
idea, if the new institution obtains more control over 
national budgets. Critics of the idea have therefore 
argued that a European Monetary Fund would primarily 
serve Germany as a powerful instrument to apply 
austerity in the Eurozone. Whether this is true will also 
depend on how the Fund is financed: while Germany 
wants to restrict funding to member states’ 
contributions, and thus maintain full control over the 
institution, France prefers the Fund to raise own 
resources. This would correspond to the mutualisation 
of debt. 
Finally, the question of democratic legitimization 
remains: how can a European Finance Minister or 
Monetary Fund be held to account? The French 
government under Macron has proposed a Eurozone 
Parliament with the powers to pass an own Eurozone 
budget and to control the ESM and a future Finance 
Minister. This assembly could consist of national 
parliamentarians or Members of the European 
Parliament, or both. Germany, however, is very 
reluctant when it comes to ceding control over the 
money it provides to other Eurozone members. 
Moreover, it shies away from the treaty changes this 
would require. Instead of a real Eurozone Parliament, a 
non-permanent committee with purely consultative 
powers therefore seems to be the best deal achievable 
for the time being. 
Although the preferences of France and Germany 
diverge in many respects, a combination of a Finance 
Minister, a fiscal capacity, and a certain degree of 
parliamentary control could form a larger package deal 
between the two countries. However, any such deal 
would need to be an exchange between solidarity and 
control. In other words, Germany will accommodate 
French solidarity-related preferences only if this will be 
linked to an enhanced control over national budgets. 
Both Macron’s ‘Europe de la croissance’ and the 
Commission’s ‘pillar of social rights’ argue that the 
Eurozone needs a stronger social dimension. Macron’s 
platform suggested upward harmonization of 
unemployment protection as one way to implement 
the above-mentioned fiscal capacity. Yet chances are 
slim that a Franco-German tandem will push the issue 
forward, as Germany is stepping on the brakes. Its 
council of economic advisers cautioned that a common 
unemployment scheme was yet another step toward 
dreaded Transferunion. The German position entails the 
belief that only internal devaluation, that is, downward 
adjustment of wages and social benefits, creates jobs in 
the Euro periphery and that market pressure is the most 
efficient way to encourage corresponding ‘structural 
reforms’. An insurance scheme would only remove this 
pressure and create moral hazard. These fears are 
widely shared among the German Christian Democrats. 
On various occasions, outgoing Finance Minister 
Schäuble dismissed Macron’s plans as unrealistic, 
suggesting they required arduous treaty reforms. There 
is no reason to expect more support from any new 
Finance Minister in the possible future ‘Jamaica’ 
coalition (Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), Liberals 
(FDP), Greens), especially if he or she is from the FDP, 
which at this point seems the most likely scenario. 
Moreover, the presumably reluctant Finnish and Dutch 
stances would pose a challenge. Nonetheless, if France 
and Germany were to bridge their differences, a 
moderate proposal could fall on fertile ground. Spain 
and Italy already outlined far-ranging visions for a 
European insurance scheme, and parts of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) have also expressed support. So 
far, however, Merkel sided with Schäuble. All things 
considered, there is thus little room for Franco-German 
agreement on a European unemployment insurance 
scheme. More likely is a further extension of European 
funding for the ‘Youth Guarantee’. 
There is much more Franco-German accord on 
reforming the single European labour market regime, 
but a successful tandem must carefully navigate the 
demands of the CEE member states. Mundell’s theory 
of optimum currency area identifies labour mobility as 
precondition for common currencies, allowing workers 
from countries hit by an asymmetric shock to find 
(temporary) employment abroad. Adjustment via 
migration, including posted work, partly compensates 
for the loss of control over the foreign exchange rate. 
Under the current rules, posted workers are subject to 
what is called the ‘hard core’ of the host-country 
provisions, including minimum salaries. Beyond this, 
posted workers may be treated differently according to 
origin. The reform has been deadlocked for many years 
due to contrary interests of the high-wage net 
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recipients such as France and Germany and the low-
wage net senders of posted workers, such as Poland and 
Romania. Macron wants to push ahead, but having 
promised French workers protection against 
globalization, he is hardly a neutral arbiter. On posted 
workers, France and Germany are on the same page. 
Both are among the EU countries with the highest 
wages, and both are net receivers of posted workers. 
With Belgium, they receive half of all postings. Rather 
than facilitate free movement of labour as potential 
buffer against asymmetric shocks, their prime 
motivation is to protect their national autonomy over 
employment regulation and their competitive position. 
Their reform proposal centres on enlarging the hard 
core, according to the principle ‘same pay for the same 
work in the same place’, a commitment to which other 
high-wage countries signed up, too. The Maltese 
Council Presidency had hoped to conclude the 
negotiations in June 2017, but Macron unravelled the 
compromise package in search of a more favourable 
deal that further limits the duration of postings and 
includes transiting road haulers.  
After Macron’s election, France and Germany worked 
intensely towards aligning their positions before 
entering into negotiations with the whole Council. A 
Franco-German ministerial council in July 2017 
reaffirmed the original demands. The tandem is 
running, but rather than driving integration forward, it 
is set on a collision course. Its interventions have 
produced logjam. The negotiations ‘will be delayed’, the 
French President admitted in a speech in May, ‘so that 
we can truly reform’. Franco-German cooperation is 
unlikely to change the fact that the CEE states are not 
going to accept a bigger hard core and a shorter posting 
duration. Since a qualified majority is necessary to 
adopt the reform, deadlock is likely to remain (Voss 
2016). 
 
Macron is well aware of the German insistence on a 
quid pro quo between solidarity and control. His 
ambitious Eurozone reform agenda cannot be realized 
without Germany and is therefore strongly linked to a 
domestic liberalization agenda that accommodates 
Berlin. ‘If we don’t implement ambitious structural 
reforms, the Germans won’t follow us’, the President 
observed in May. Already the Loi Macron, adopted 
under Hollande, came about when Brussels and Berlin 
tightened the screws over the French budget deficit. 
The current labour market reform continues where the 
Loi Macron left off. Employment protections are to be 
loosened, more issues in collective bargaining devolved 
to the company level, red tape and public sector 
employment cut back, and the business tax lowered. 
When faced with the choice between delivering on 
promised tax cuts and complying with the 
Schuldenbremse, Macron opted for the latter. 
In sum, the French and German visions for the 
Eurozone’s badly needed reform are hard to reconcile. 
Where France sees powerful shock absorbing capacities 
and solidarity, Germany sees moral hazard and insists 
on national responsibility. On some issues both 
governments seem to agree superficially, but once it 
comes to the nitty-gritty, for example regarding a 
European Finance Minister’s concrete tasks, the conflict 
that looms behind ambiguous labels becomes manifest. 
Only when it comes to protecting national labour 
markets, France and Germany are truly on the same 
page, but against headwind from CEE countries, the 
tandem cannot gain much traction. 
A way out of the deadlock? 
Our analysis shows that neither the issues on the table 
nor the preferences of the two countries have changed 
significantly with the election of Macron as President. 
Moreover, since Germany is the more powerful partner 
in this relationship (and, as a creditor state, closer to the 
status quo), one may argue that in order to set the 
tandem in motion, a change in the Élysée Palace is of 
little help as long as the Christian Democrats lead the 
German government. If, moreover, the Liberal Party 
supplies the next Finance Minister, the tandem will be 
even more constrained. Why, therefore, should there 
be any optimism regarding the future of the Franco-
German tandem and its effect on the urging Eurozone 
reform? 
We argue that the election of Emmanuel Macron is a 
chance for taking up Eurozone reform. First, Macron 
abandoned certain labels such as ‘Eurobonds’ that set 
off alarm bells in Berlin. Second, he adopted a more 
temperate political communication than his 
predecessor, both in style and content. This is especially 
important with regard to German voters. Whereas 
Hollande came into office as the Socialist who wanted 
to backtrack on the Fiscal Compact – a European version 
of the German Schuldenbremse – and mutualize public 
debt, Macron comes across as a pro-European 
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reformer. His demonstrated willingness to implement 
structural reforms at home signals credible 
commitment to German voters. Macron also refrains 
from demanding any institutional change that would be 
all too clearly to the alleged disadvantage of the 
German taxpayer. By contrast, ideas like a Eurozone 
Finance Minister or a Eurozone Parliament seem to 
promise enhanced control and legitimacy rather than 
fiscal profligacy and common debt. 
However, while this may do away with key concerns of 
German voters, it still does not solve the problem of 
distributional conflicts and diverging preferences at the 
European level: new labels alone do not enable win-win 
solutions. Moreover, many of Macron’s ideas would 
require a change of the EU treaties, which is considered 
infeasible for the time being. Macron’s election may 
therefore just be a necessary condition for a revival of 
the Franco-German tandem – it is not sufficient for 
bringing about institutional change. In order for the 
latter to succeed, the two governments must either be 
pushed by an ever less tenable status quo, or be pulled 
by new benefits appearing on the horizon. Both push- 
and pull-factors can emerge from events at the 
international, European or domestic level. 
First, international events may increase the costs of the 
status quo or enable new benefits in several policy 
areas. This enhances the attractiveness of cross-
sectoral deals between France and Germany. For 
instance, the current ‘refugee crisis’ brings Germany in 
the position of a demandeur because France is in less 
need of a common asylum system (and its preferences 
thereby closer to the status quo). In the Eurozone crisis, 
the situation is inverse: France suffers higher costs and 
is therefore more interested in a common solution. 
Hence, linking the refugee crisis to the Eurozone crisis 
could enable new deals, as Germany might 
accommodate French preferences on economic 
governance in exchange for its support in reforming the 
EU’s migration policy. An example of new benefits 
appearing on the horizon is Brexit. The UK’s exit not only 
requires treaty change, which member states have so 
far avoided, but also renders an agreement on treaty 
negotiations and legislation more likely, as with the UK 
an important veto player is leaving the EU. For example, 
reforms of the European labour market have stalled not 
in the least due to the UK. With regard to the 
international security environment, finally, Germany 
may become more dependent on France, as Russia 
pursues an increasingly assertive foreign and security 
policy, and as the USA under President Trump are less 
reliable as a partner. Indeed, Chancellor Merkel has 
already made explicit that the era in which Europe could 
fully rely on others is over and that it therefore must 
take its fate in its own hands. This may not only re-
establish the ‘balance of imbalances’ between German 
economic power and French military power, but also 
enable cross-sectoral agreements in economic 
governance and security cooperation. 
Second, events in the Eurozone may increase the status 
quo costs for Germany or France and thus enhance the 
functional pressure to agree on further steps of 
Eurozone reform. If, for instance, major Italian banks 
get into trouble or no agreement on the next ESM 
tranche for Greece can be reached, the entire Eurozone 
may find itself again on the verge of an existential crisis. 
This would force Germany and France to agree on 
further reform steps, as the collapse of the Eurozone is 
much more costly than single concessions needed for a 
new compromise. Still, any intra-sectoral deal between 
the two countries will be based on the formula ‘more 
solidarity only in exchange for more control’. 
Finally, domestic events can alter the costs and benefits 
of the Franco-German cooperation. Until now, the 
German government has been constrained by the run-
up to the federal elections in September. It is well-
known that pre-election periods do not leave much 
room for difficult decisions. The right-wing populists of 
the Front National and Alternative für Deutschland 
would (mis)use each pro-European decision to obtain 
votes at the cost of the governing parties. With Le Pen 
for now defeated and the German election contest 
over, the new German and French governments will 
have more leeway in making pro-European 
arrangements. However, both Macron and Merkel 
remain challenged by populist parties. They know that 
kicking the can down the road would only favour 
populists and signal their governments’ inability to act. 
Ironically, the populist challenge may thus encourage 
the tandem to close ranks and accept mutual 
concessions in Eurozone reform. At the same time, 
however, much depends on the ongoing coalition-
formation in Germany. If the FDP, which regards 
solidarity as a cause of moral hazard, supplies the 
Finance Minister, the room for concessions will not 
expand but even shrink. 
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Conclusion 
Although our analysis of French and German 
preferences regarding Eurozone reform does not allow 
us to share the current media enthusiasm, we consider 
a revival of the tandem to be an indispensable condition 
for the pending completion of the Economic and 
Monetary Union. We therefore highlight factors that 
may enable a revival of the Franco-German motor in 
spite of deep and persistent differences. Crisis events 
on the international level or in the Eurozone may 
increase the cost of ‘muddling through’ to an extent 
that makes painful Franco-German compromises more 
attractive. On the domestic level, the end of two 
consecutive election campaigns heralds a return to 
Sachpolitik, while the ongoing populist challenge may 
well encourage a common line. Even if the Franco-
German tandem can agree on further reform steps, 
fundamental distributive issues will remain (creditor vs. 
debtor states; solidarity vs. austerity etc.). Therefore, 
any deal between the two countries will be based on 
the formula solidarity vs. control: Germany will only 
agree to more burden-sharing in the Eurozone if this is 
tied to more control over national budgets. Moreover, 
technocratic solutions such as a Eurozone Finance 
Minister do not necessarily improve the life of the 
people in crisis-ridden member states. Thus, the 
tandem will not only have to enhance burden-sharing 
and control in the Eurozone, but will also need to bring 
forward the Eurozone’s social dimension. A European 
unemployment scheme, for example, could be a first 
step in this direction. Next to building up a social pillar 
of the Economic and Monetary Union, the Franco-
German motor will, finally, have to pay attention to the 
democratic legitimacy of its actions. On the one hand, 
this concerns the process of Eurozone reform: while it 
is important to take the lead by setting the agenda, 
compensating potential losers, and leading by example, 
the preferences of other member states need to be 
taken into account. On the other hand, the outcomes of 
Franco-German leadership must be legitimized. The 
best way of doing so is by tying institutional innovations 
at the European level – such as a Finance Minister or a 
European Monetary Fund – to the oversight of the 
European Parliament.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Views expressed in the College of Europe Policy Briefs are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect positions 
of either the series editors or the College of Europe. Free online subscription at www.coleurope.eu/CEPOB. 
Further Reading 
  
Enderlein, Henrik & Jörg Haas, “What would a European Finance Minister do? 
A proposal”, Policy Paper 145, Berlin, Jacques-Delors-Institut, 2015, 
http://www.institutdelors.eu/media/ministrefinanceeuropeenjdi-ben.pdf 
European Commission, Reflection Paper on the deepening of the Economic 
and Monetary Union, 31 May 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-emu_en.pdf 
Macron, Emmanuel, Initiative pour l’Europe, Speech at Sorbonne University, 
Paris, 26 September 2017, http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/ 
article/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-
europe-souveraine-unie-democratique/ 
Schild, Joachim, “Leadership in hard times: Germany, France, and the 
management of the Eurozone crisis”, German Politics and Society, vol. 31, 
no. 1, 2013, pp. 24-47. 
Véron, Nicolas et al., “A resilient Euro needs Franco-German compromise”, 
Bruegel, 27 September 2017, http://bruegel.org/2017/09/a-resilient-euro-
needs-franco-german-compromise 
Voss, Eckhard, Posting of Workers Directive: Current situation and challenges, 
doc.PE.579.001, Brussels, European Parliament, 7 June 2016. 
Webber, Douglas (ed.), The Franco-German relationship in the European 
Union, London, Routledge, 1999. 
 
About the Authors 
  
